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Social Class, Taste and Inequalities in the Creative Industries
Lead authors:  
Dr Orian Brook, Dr David O’Brien, and Dr Mark Taylor. 1 
This report forms part of Panic! It’s an Arts Emergency project, and 
draws on several academic papers. 2 Those papers, which are all 
available via the web links in the text, have been written in collabo-
ration with several co-authors. More information can be found in the 
Introduction and Appendix. 
The authors commissioned Create London to deliver a cultural pro-
gramme around the themes of this research. As part of this, Create 
London and the Barbican will convene an afternoon of discussion at 
the Barbican Centre, to reflect on the content of this report and 
share it with the sector and the public: www.barbican.org.uk/whats-
on/event/panic-2018. 
Panic! It’s an Arts Emergency additionally comprises a public resource 
by Arts Emergency, a creative careers project for young people, and 
a new work by artist Ellie Harrison. It is a continuation of a project 
initiated by Create London in 2015, which included a nationwide 
survey of artists and creative industries workers (the Panic! dataset) 
and follow up interviews. Find out more about all of the above at: 
www.createlondon.org/event/panic2018/
Funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. 3 
1. Contact @orianbrook @drdaveobrien @markrt or d.obrien@ed.ac.uk 
2. This report draws on several papers, both working papers and published final versions. 
The academic papers are all available from the web links in the text, and have been 
written in collaboration with several co-authors. We’d like to thank Peter Campbell 
(University of Liverpool), Sam Friedman (London School of Economics), Daniel Laurison 
(Swarthmore College), Siobhan McAndrew (University of Bristol), Andrew Miles 
(University of Manchester), and Kate Oakley (University of Leeds).  
3. ‘Who is missing from the picture? The problem of inequality in the creative economy 
and what we can do about it.’ Project Reference AH/P013155/1
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Introduction
The idea of a fair and diverse industry is central to current discus-
sions about cultural and creative jobs. However, as this report will 
demonstrate, the cultural and creative industries are marked by 
significant inequalities; in particular, we look at the social class back-
ground of the workforce, and how this intersects with other issues, 
including attitudes and values, experiences of working for free, 
social networks, and cultural tastes.
Inequality in the arts regularly forms the basis for public discus-
sions about culture in Britain. For example, we have recently seen 
scandals over gender pay gaps at the BBC; political inquiries about 
working class representation in the theatre industry; and a wealth of 
blogging and social media commentary focused on representations 
of race and ethnicity in the arts. 
What is missing is an understanding of the scale of social inequal-
ities, along with a clearer understanding of how these inequalities 
operate. 
This was the starting point for a team of academics from the Uni-
versities of Edinburgh and Sheffield who undertook research funded 
by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, as part of a scheme 
to create public impact with academic research on the creative 
economy. This public impact is being co-produced and delivered 
through the Panic! 2018 project, led by Create London. Create 
London in turn is working in partnership with the Barbican Centre 
and Arts Emergency to deliver a cultural programme around the 
themes of this research. The report creatively visualises data and 
analysis. Full tables, graphs, and figures are available from the 
academic papers.
 
This report presents:
• the first analysis of cultural and creative workers’ values and atti-
tudes, using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey
• the first analysis of cultural and creative workers’ cultural atten-
dance, using data from the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport’s (now the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport) 
Taking Part Survey
• the first analysis of social mobility into cultural occupations using 
data from the Office for National Statistics’ Longitudinal Study
• an analysis of the demographics of the cultural and creative work-
force using the Office for National Statistics’ Labour Force Survey 
Introduction
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• analysis of survey and interview data from the 2015 Panic! What 
happened to social mobility in the arts? project. This analysis 
demonstrates participants’ experiences and understandings of 
unpaid work; their social capital; and their views on getting in and 
getting on in cultural and creative occupations.
The report adopts an inter-sectional approach to workforce in-
equalities, where the data allows. As a result, the report shows that 
the cultural and creative sector is marked by significant exclusions 
of those from working class social origins. We try to demonstrate 
how it intersects with other characteristics, primarily gender and 
ethnicity. Women, and those from Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) 
communities face barriers in addition to those associated with 
social class origin. Class as discussed in the report is much more 
than media clichés about “the white working class”. 
In terms of social class, social mobility has been a longstanding 
problem for the sector, meaning that it is currently dominated by 
those from affluent social origins. There was also no ‘golden age’ for 
social mobility within the cultural sector. 
At the same time, our analysis of the Panic! dataset shows those 
respondents who are the best paid are most likely to think the sector 
rewards talent and hard work, and are least likely to see exclusions 
of class, ethnicity and gender in the workforce. 
The Panic! data also shows respondents’ limited social networks: 
how the creatives responding to the Panic! Survey tended to know 
other creatives, to the exclusion of many other occupations.
The workforce inequalities are reinforced by the prevalence of 
unpaid labour. Panic! respondents overwhelmingly said they had 
worked for free. 
Alongside the inequalities in the workforce, this report paints a 
picture of a cultural sector which is exclusive in more subtle ways. 
The analysis shows the taste patterns of cultural workers are sub-
stantially different from those of the rest of the population; this dif-
ference is replicated in workers’ values and attitudes, which are the 
most liberal and left wing of any set of occupations. 
The report summarises a specific set of research papers, using 
specific datasets. As a result, it is not a comprehensive picture of 
every axis of social inequality. Much more research is needed on, for 
example, the impact of disability on the creative workforce and on 
arts audiences. 
However, the research presented and summarised here is an 
important challenge for the cultural industries in Britain. 
Introduction
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Part 1: Getting in and getting on: Beliefs in meritocracy 4
To begin, we introduce data from the Panic! Survey which took place 
in 2015, and which received 2,487 unique responses. 
We explore how a high proportion of respondents to the original 
Panic! Survey believe that success in their sector is based on hard 
work and talent (otherwise known as ‘meritocratic’ beliefs); and how 
the survey respondents who are most attached to this idea are 
highly-paid white men, irrespective of age. 
We then use data from the 237 interviews conducted following 
the Panic! Survey to illustrate how these meritocratic beliefs are 
talked about and experienced. 
This is troubling, as the faith in the sector’s meritocracy may signal 
a belief that little or nothing should change. Particularly worrying is 
the fact that those people who are in the best position to effect 
change are the very people who most strongly support the merito-
cratic explanation. 
This discussion sets the scene for the rest of the report, as we go 
on to show how the prevailing belief in meritocracy is not matched 
by the reality of the sector. 
The starting point for showing this mismatch comes from analysing 
the social networks or  the ‘social capital ’ of Panic! respondents. 
The analysis shows our cultural and creative workers have narrow 
social networks, suggesting a type of social closure within the sector. 
Panic! respondents believe in meritocracy
Did our Panic! Survey respondents think the cultural and creative 
industries were fair? We used responses to a standard set of ques-
tions about working in the creative industries to understand a 
respondent’s perceptions of fairness in the sector.
We asked: ‘Looking at your creative occupation as a whole, how 
important do you think each of these is in getting ahead?’ We offered 
a range of answers for them to rate in terms of importance: 
- coming from a wealthy family; 
- having well-educated parents; 
- being well educated; 
- having ambition; 
Part 1: Getting in and getting on: Beliefs in meritocracy 
4. This analysis is based on Taylor, M. and O’Brien, D. (2017) “‘Culture is a meritocracy’: 
Why creative workers’ attitudes may reinforce social inequality,” Sociological Research 
Online 22(4). Available from  
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1360780417726732
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- hard work; 
- knowing the right people;
- your talent; 
- your ethnic group; 
- your gender; 
- your class; 
- your religion.
This question, and the range of responses, is used in standard surveys 
internationally and is validated as a way of exploring people’s attitudes. 
In our analysis, we grouped the responses along three lines. 
First there were responses associated with ‘meritocracy’. These 
include talent, ambition, and hard work. This cluster of responses 
suggests individuals get rewarded for what they put in, or receive 
what they deserve from the sector, irrespective of background or 
privileges. 
Our second group reflects what social scientists call ‘social repro-
duction’ explanations, such as networks (who you know), family 
background and wealth, along with gender and ethnicity. These 
explanations point to barriers in the cultural sector, so that no matter 
how talented or hard working someone is, they will still struggle if 
they aren’t part of the same class, ethnicity, and/or gender as the 
people hiring and promoting them. 
Finally, there are responses associated with education – people’s 
own, and their parents’. These responses didn’t fit closely with either 
set of responses. Research shows a strong relationship between 
someone’s level of education and their abilities, but also finds that 
people from middle class homes have better access to elite 
educational institutions. 
Figure 1 shows the pattern of our respondents’ answers relating 
to meritocracy and social reproduction. 
At the top left-hand corner we find those respondents (30%) who 
most strongly think that talent and hard work explains getting in and 
getting on in the cultural and creative industries (CCIs), and do not 
agree that class and knowing the right people are important. These 
respondents describe the sector as ‘meritocratic’.
Part 1: Getting in and getting on: Beliefs in meritocracy 
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Figure 1 How responses cluster around meritocracy or social reproduction
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This person believes ambition, hard work and talent, as well as 
ethnicity, class and gender all very important or essential to 
getting ahead. They combine both meritocracy and social repro-
duction explanations for success.
This person believes ambition, hard work and talent are essential 
to getting ahead, but ethnicity, class, and coming from a wealthy 
family are not important at all to getting ahead. They suggest 
meritocracy explains success.
This person believes ethnicity, class and gender were not im-
portant at all, and that ambition, hard work and talent were only 
fairly important. They emphasise neither meritocracy nor social 
reproduction in their explanation of success. 
This person believes coming from a wealthy family, knowing the 
right people and class are very important to success, but talent 
and hard work were not very important. They suggest social 
reproduction explains success.
By contrast to the top left hand corner, those respondents clustered 
in the bottom right hand corner (21%) were most likely to suggest 
‘social reproduction’. These respondents emphasised social barriers 
or exclusions, rather than talent or hard work. 
The top right-hand corner clusters those (34%) who emphasised 
both social reproduction and meritocracy; those believing hard work 
and talent are essential, but acknowledging the roles of barriers and 
exclusions. 
Finally, those respondents in the bottom left-hand corner (16%) 
emphasise neither, perhaps believing that success in the CCIs is more-
or-less random.
As we can see, the majority of respondents are in the top area of 
the plot. This suggests the prevailing opinion among our survey 
respondents was towards a belief that the sector is meritocratic. 
Some respondents recognised the influence of social factors, such 
as class, age, race, and ‘who you know’. But the majority of respon-
dents believe that hard work, talent, and ambition are essential to 
getting ahead. 
To put this in some context, the people at the meeting point of the 
four sections described coming from a wealthy family and class as fairly 
important, ambition and talent as very important, and hard work as 
essential. So almost all the people whom we have classified as 
believing in social reproduction will have drawn on some element of 
the meritocracy characteristics in their explanation for success.
Part 1: Getting in and getting on: Beliefs in meritocracy 
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Levels of agreement with these explanations of “getting in and 
getting on” in the sector were similar across the demographics of 
our respondents, with similar stories told by women, by people of 
working class origin, and by people from ethnic minority backgrounds. 
However, there is one group that stands out – the highly paid. 
These respondents, who are in the most influential positions in the 
creative industries, believe most strongly in meritocracy. They are 
also most sceptical of the impact of social factors, such as gender, 
class or ethnicity, on explanations for success in the sector. 
Interestingly, the best paid and those in senior roles hold these 
attitudes irrespective of their starting point in life. It seems, looking 
at the Panic! respondents, once people have achieved major success 
within the sector they become most committed to talent and hard 
work as explaining that success. Those who most believed in meri-
tocracy in the sector, and who were least likely to believe in social 
reproduction, were those being paid more than £50,000 per year.
We saw this combination of beliefs in meritocracy and social re-
production in many of the discussions with our interviewees. 
Rachel, Kate and Zoe all used ‘hard work’, or ‘meritocracy’ expla-
nations for success. For example, they stressed hard work and tenacity, 
rather than their class, or networks in their perceptions of success:
‘Most people who have got successful would have had to be quite 
tenacious is that the word? In terms of like keeping on submitting 
things and like going up for competitions or trying to get involved 
with events and things, because yeah it is hard to get anywhere if 
you are quite shy or lacking in confidence I suppose.’ 
– Rachel, a white middle class social origin woman in her 30s, 
working in publishing
‘I genuinely think keeping going is a huge part of it. You know when 
I was in my early 30’s a lot of friends stopped being actors and 
writers and they stopped because they wanted to buy houses  
or they wanted to have children and they wanted the security…
However, the main difference was tenacity in my view because  
I haven’t been lucky.’
– Kate, a white working class social origin woman in her 50s, 
working in publishing
‘I think there is a bit of luck to it, but I think at the end of the day the 
people who will succeed are really the people who are willing to 
sacrifice the most for it… I think it is the people who are willing to 
give up the other bits of their life who are most likely to succeed.’ 
– Zoe, a white, middle class social origin woman in her 20s,  
working in theatre
Part 1: Getting in and getting on: Beliefs in meritocracy 
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We can contrast this with ‘social reproduction’ explanations. Nisha 
and Jennifer both cite the importance of social networks in their 
stories of who is successful. 
‘The UK film industry is not a meritocracy at all. It doesn’t matter  
if you’re intelligent or well qualified or any of those things. What 
matters is who you know and who you’ve worked with.’ 
– Nisha, a British Asian woman from middle class social origins  
in her 30s, working in film and television 
‘I think the trouble with the arts industry is that it’s so based on 
networking and the sort of social skills, how you behave at 
openings… I have a colleague who is a freelance artist. He’s from a 
middle class background and he’s a bloke. I was just left stunned 
by his ability to just introduce himself and start talking to people 
and networking in the middle of this seminar.’ 
– Jennifer, a white working class origin woman in her 60s,  
working in visual arts
Jennifer connects the characteristics of male, middle class-ness to 
success at networking, and networking to success in the arts. 
Existing academic research has demonstrated that networks, 
(who you know), are crucial to getting in and getting on in the creative 
industries. This is especially true in those creative occupations that 
are predominantly freelance.
Just hard work? Or does it help to know people?
What sort of jobs were included in the networks of our Panic! re-
spondents? As part of the Panic! Survey we asked the 2,487 respon-
dents to tell us about their networks. We asked if they knew people 
in a range of different jobs, whether as friends or as family members.
Figure 2 shows the Panic! Survey respondents’ answers to ‘who 
do you know?’
Part 1: Getting in and getting on: Beliefs in meritocracy 
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This diagram shows how Panic! respondents were disproportion-
ately likely to know other cultural and creative workers and less likely 
to know people working in non-creative jobs (as friends, family mem-
bers and colleagues). They seem to know other creatives, rather 
than knowing factory workers, bus drivers or solicitors, although 
they were also likely to know lecturers, and sales assistants. Broadly, 
the jobs they were least likely to know people in were traditionally 
working class jobs, such as factory workers, bus drivers, and postal 
workers, although they were also unlikely to know bank managers. 
This is as expected, given the nature of their occupational net-
works, and may reflect the fact that those in middle class occupa-
tions tend not to know many people in working class occupations, 
either as friends or as family members. It may also reflect the smaller 
numbers of traditional ‘working class’ occupations in society overall 
(as we discuss in Part 2). 
Conclusion
One way of reading these results is to conclude that knowing other 
creatives is essential for finding work. The socially homogeneous 
nature of our respondents may simply reflect the need to know other 
creatives for work. 
Likewise, the prevailing opinion in the Panic! responses was that 
the sector is fair. Hard work is the most important thing for getting 
ahead, talent is rewarded, and a person’s religion, gender, ethnicity, 
and class are much less important. 
However, these interpretations raise questions in the context of 
inequalities in the sector. 
First, to what extent are cultural and creative occupations acces-
sible to all? Especially if they are, by occupational network, quite 
homogeneous? Moreover, even the shared belief in meritocracy has 
some important distinctions, as the quotes from Nisha and Jennifer 
suggested. These distinctions can be mapped onto broader social 
inequalities. 
To what extent is the cultural sector delivering on representing 
individuals, communities and the nation if Panic! data suggests its 
social networks are relatively homogenous and coherent? And if its 
workers share a belief in meritocracy?
Looking at our CCIs, who is missing from the picture? Parts 2, 3 
and 4 suggest culture is marked by serious inequalities and is not the 
meritocracy Panic! respondents think it is. 
Part 1: Getting in and getting on: Beliefs in meritocracy 
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Part 2: Culture’s unequal workforce: How people of Working 
Class origin have been and continue to be excluded
‘It’s just so important, because people don’t believe you. People just 
think that you have a chip on your shoulder, and I hate that. That’s 
why I don’t talk about it. I don’t want people to think that I have a 
chip on my shoulder, but I just feel, and I really don’t think I’m being 
paranoid, but I just really feel that the mathematics don’t add up, and 
I don’t think it’s a skills gap issue, which everyone would like you  
to believe. I think it’s a hiring issue, and I think it’s a systemic issue.
I wouldn’t care so much if it was a systemic and hiring issue in 
banking, but I care because it’s in the arts. It really fucking sucks 
that it’s in the arts, because we’re suffering because of it, and this 
country and its cultural output is suffering because of it.’
– Nisha, a British Asian woman from middle class social origins in her 
30s, working in film and television. Panic! Survey respondent.
The quote above illustrates a key frustration at the gap between per-
ceptions of the sector and the reality in terms of who is in the work-
force and how workers make a living. 
Moreover, Nisha’s comment draws attention to why who works in 
the arts is such an important issue.
In this part, we contrast the belief in hard work and talent as ex-
planations for success, discussed in Part 1, with the reality of the 
makep of the workforce. 
Currently, a key characteristic of the British cultural and creative 
workforce is the absence of those from working class social origins. 
At the same time, there are significant under-representations of 
women and those from minority ethnic communities in specific 
cultural occupations such as Film, TV, video, radio and photography; 
and Music, performing, and visual art. 
People working within culture, making culture, are not currently 
representative of the nation’s demographics and there is more work 
to be done to truly make the workforce open to all. 
We also show that this is a longstanding problem, there was no 
‘golden age’ for social mobility and equality in cultural occupations.
Part 2: Culture’s unequal workforce: How people of Working Class origin 
have been and continue to be excluded
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Who works in cultural and creative occupations?
Inequalities and exclusions in the current workforce are demon-
strated in findings from two academic papers analysing Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) data on the British workforce. 5
In the Appendix you can find a table with the the basic demo-
graphics of the occupations constituting the cultural and creative 
industries in the UK. In Figure 3 we highlight some key findings. We 
use ethnicity, gender and class 6 as three demographic categories 
to show issues of inequality in the jobs producing culture in the UK.
5. This analysis is based on O’Brien, D., Laurison, D., Friedman, S. and Miles, A. (2016).  
‘Are the creative industries meritocratic? An analysis of the 2014 British Labour Force 
Survey’, Cultural Trends, 25, 116 – 131. Available from www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/09548963.2016.1170943?journalCode=ccut20
and Oakley, K., Laurison, D., O’Brien, D. and Friedman, S. (2017) ‘Cultural Capital:  
Arts Graduates, Spatial Inequality, and London’s Impact on Cultural Labor Markets’, 
American Behavioral Scientist 61(12), 1510–1531. Available from  
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002764217734274
6. National Statistics Socio-economic Classificaition (NS-SEC) categories are fully 
explained in the ‘Key terms’ section of the Appendix at the end of this report. They are 
the categories we use to understand social class origins, based on parental occupation. 
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Figure 3 Creative Industries Workforce Demographics
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First, it is worth noting how much the occupational sectors differ 
from each other. IT, which includes IT consultancy as well as game 
development, has a good representation of those from minority ethnic 
backgrounds, but has a very low number of women in its workforce. 
In contrast, the arts are not diverse in terms of ethnicity. The fol-
lowing sectors have particularly low numbers of Black and Minority 
Ethnic (BAME) workers: Museums, galleries and libraries (2.7%); 
Film, TV, video, radio and photography (4.2%); and Music, perform-
ing and visual arts (4.8%). 
Almost every occupational sector has an underrepresentation of 
women in its workforce, with Publishing (52.9%) and Museums, 
galleries and libraries (64.8%) the only two sectors where women 
are not under-represented compared to the workforce overall.
The story of social class within this story is one of exclusion. Every 
sector apart from Crafts, which includes smiths, glass makers and 
ceramicists, has an over-representation of those from upper middle 
class 7 social origins, with those from working class origins making 
up far less of the workforce. 
The situation in Publishing is especially grave, with over a third of 
the workers from the upper middle class social origins and only 
about an eighth from working class origins. 
People from upper middle class origins are overrepresented in many 
creative occupations, compared to those from working class origins. 
They are also overrepresented compared to the overall numbers 
of upper middle class origin and working class origin in the labour force 
as a whole. It appears that creative jobs are thus highly exclusive. 
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7. We are focused on just the higher managerial and professional for our analysis. 
Because of this we use the term ‘upper middle class social origins’. This group 
corresponds to those people who grew up in a household where the main income  
earner worked in a higher managerial or professional job, part of the ONS’ NS-SEC I 
category. We’ve used this term as it is clearer than repeating ‘professional and 
managerial’ or using NS-SEC I within the text. 
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Again, aside from Crafts, no creative occupation comes close to 
having a third of its workforce from working class 8 origins, which is 
the average for the population as a whole. 
At the same time, every set of creative occupations aside from 
Crafts has many more workers from the upper middle class origin, 
compared to just under a seventh of the population as a whole. 
Inequality and location – London and beyond
The national picture presents even more of an issue when we consider 
regional inequalities. A recent report by the Centre for Economic 
Performance 9 showed how disproportionately creative businesses 
in the UK are clustered in the South East of England, particularly in 
London. As we know, the cost of living is higher in London than in 
the rest of the UK, which is important to remember in the context of 
Part 3’s discussion of unpaid work. London also has a different, more 
diverse population. 
Our analysis finds important differences in the cultural and cre-
ative industry workforce in London, as compared to the rest of the 
country. 
There is some good news about London’s creative workforce. In 
a paper published in American Behavioral Scientist in 2017, Oakley 
and her co-authors found gender inequalities were not as 
pronounced in London (60.5 % of London’s creative workforce are 
men, compared to just under 70% in other urban areas in the UK) 
and there is a better representation of ethnic minorities (17% of 
London’s creative workforce are BAME individuals, compared to 6% 
of the creative workforce in the rest of the UK). 10
However, data from the 2011 census indicates BAME individuals are 
39% of London’s working age population. This suggests that even the 
good demographic news about London’s cultural and creative indus-
tries still speaks to significant exclusions of the city’s population. 
Just as the story of ethnicity and creative occupations in London 
is a cause for concern, the story of social class is equally worrying. 
Over a third (34.8%) of the creative workforce in London are from 
upper-middle class origins. This is significantly more than the cre-
8. Likewise, we use ‘working class social origins’ to correspond to parental NS-SEC 
VI-VIII. This group of people are defined as having grown up in a household where  
the main income earner worked in a semi-routine or routine manual job, or was long 
term unemployed. 
9. Bernick, S., Davies, R. and Valero, A. (2017) Industry in Britain – An Atlas CfEP Special 
Paper 34. Available from http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/special/cepsp34.pdf 
10. All figures on London are taken from Oakley, K., Laurison, D., O’Brien, D. and 
Friedman, S. (2017) ‘Cultural Capital: Arts Graduates, Spatial Inequality, and London’s 
Impact on Cultural Labor Markets’, American Behavioral Scientist 61(12) 1510–1531. 
Available from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002764217734274
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ative workers in the rest of the UK (23% from these origins). 
You don’t have to be from an economically privileged back-
ground to work in London, where the bulk of creative and cultural 
jobs are located, but coming from an upper middle class back-
ground offers significant advantages for people struggling to make 
it in the capital. 
Pay inequalities
The picture from the ONS data is of a workforce for cultural occu-
pations that is marked by significant exclusions, by class, gender 
and ethnicity. The same ONS data also shows important gaps in pay, 
based on gender and social class origin. In a 2016 paper published 
in Cultural Trends, O’Brien and his co-authors found important 
differences in pay for creative workers.
Across all creative industries women are estimated to earn 
£5,800 less per year than otherwise similarly employed men. The 
situation is especially bad in the Film, TV, video, radio and photo-
graphy occupational sector, with estimates of a £15,000 per year 
gender pay gap. 11
 In terms of class origin, there are clear pay gaps between those 
from upper-middle class origins and those from working class 
starting points. For example, in Publishing there is evidence of a class 
pay gap of up to £23,000 a year. However, much of this class pay gap 
is related to individuals’ education levels. This does not account for 
the gender pay gap identified in analysis of the cultural workforce. 
Gaps in pay mean that even when women or those from working 
class origins make it into cultural occupations, they still struggle to 
compete with colleagues who are male or from upper-middle class 
starting points. 
Change over time: social mobility in creative occupations 
since 1981 12
What about change over time, rather than just in the current work-
force? 
11. Figures from O’Brien, D., Laurison, D., Friedman, S., and Miles, A. (2016). ‘Are the 
creative industries meritocratic? An analysis of the 2014 British Labour Force Survey’, 
Cultural Trends, 25, 116–131. Available from www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/09548963.2016.1170943?journalCode=ccut20 
12. This analysis is drawn from the full working paper on social mobility into creative 
jobs available from Brook, O., O’Brien, D. & Taylor, M., 2018. ‘There was no golden age: 
social mobility into cultural and creative occupations’. Available from  
www.osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/7njy3
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Our research shows that some of the fears about declining social 
mobility in cultural jobs are a reflection of broader social change. 
The longstanding barriers stopping people from working class 
origins getting cultural jobs are now combined with changes in 
Britain’s class structure. This means social inequalities in the cultural 
workforce are more evident. 
There are two aspects to the importance of social mobility in cre-
ative jobs: first, what are the chances of people from different origins 
getting this kind of work? This relates to social justice, openness and 
equality of opportunity. 
Second, what is the social class mix of those working in cultural 
jobs at different points in time? This tells us something about the di-
versity of life experiences and backgrounds represented in the sector, 
which will influence the culture that is produced and commissioned.
From our analysis of the Labour Force Survey we can see cultural 
jobs have major representation issues when it comes to class, gender 
and ethnicity.13 We now focus on how one of these categories, class, 
has changed over time. 
Here we present analysis of the ONS Longitudinal Study,14 which 
takes a 1% sample of Census returns in England and Wales since 1971 
and links life events through time. This lets us see what individuals’ 
parents’ jobs were when they were teenagers, along with the 
individuals’ jobs in subsequent censuses. (More details about this 
method and about defining social class can be found in the 
Appendix to this report.) 
 Here we compare those born between 1953 and 1962 (now aged 
56 – 65) to those born between 1983 and 1992 (now aged 26 – 35). 
Figure 4 shows our two cohorts, the oldest in the top half of the 
graph. The left hand side are working in the core cultural and artistic 
occupations, the right are all jobs across the economy.
13. This section only addresses trends in class-based inequalities. Other trends are 
addressed in the full working paper. For example, the relationship between gender, 
ethnicity and class over time is complicated, as women and BAME groups have 
increased their educational qualifications at a greater rate than white men. This  
affects occupational status. There has also been greater growth in working-age people 
of BAME origin. These facts, in combination with small sample sizes for creative  
jobs, make discussion of these statistical relationships beyond the scope of this report. 
14. The permission of the Office for National Statistics to use the Longitudinal Study is 
gratefully acknowledged, as is the help provided by staff of the Centre for Longitudinal 
Study Information and User Support (CeLSIUS). CeLSIUS is supported by the ESRC 
Census of Population Programme (Award Ref: ES/K000365/1). The authors alone are 
responsible for the interpretation of the data.
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Figure 4 Class origins of employees in arts and cultural jobs compared to all jobs
PERCENTAGE OF 19–28 YEAR OLDS IN WORK BY SOCIAL CLASS ORIGIN 
(SOURCE: ONS LONGITUDINAL STUDY)
The chart, on the left-hand side shows the proportion of people from 
different social backgrounds entering ‘core’ cultural occupations 
from each cohort, at the time of the census when they were aged 
19–28 (1981 and 2011 respectively). Upper-middle class origins 
(parents in professional and higher managerial occupations) are 
shown in pink, and working class in pattern. We define our core cultur- 
al occupations as artists, musicians, actors, and as workers in publish- 
ing, media, libraries, museums and galleries.
The chart on the right, shows those aged 19–28 in the entire work-
force, again contrasting those from upper middle class with working 
class origins.
This analysis lets us make two points. First about the proportion of 
upper-middle class origin people in cultural occupations; second about 
the chances of different people getting into cultural jobs, over time. 
The proportion of young cultural workers from upper-middle class 
backgrounds more than doubled between 1981 and 2011, from 15% 
to 33%. The proportion from working class origins dropped by about 
a third, from 22% to 13% over the same period. In 1981 there were 
more young people from working class origins entering creative jobs 
than from upper-middle class origins; this situation had reversed 
in 2011. 
As has been discussed in the media, those who entered creative 
jobs in the late 1970s and early 1980s see those entering recently as 
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being more likely to be from upper middle class backgrounds than 
their own peer group were. These results confirm the perceptions of 
the increasing domination of creative jobs by those from upper-
middle class, professional and managerial, backgrounds.
However, this is as a result of changes to Britain’s class structure. 
The chances of different social groups getting into cultural jobs 
have been stable and have not in fact changed. 
Young people from upper-middle class origins were dispropor-
tionately represented in creative jobs, compared to their numbers 
in the economy overall, by a factor of 2 in both the 1981 and 2011 
Census. (15% vs 7%, 33% vs 16%). 
Young people from working class origins were by contrast, under- 
represented, having only half the proportion of the creative work-
force compared to all jobs, in both 1981 and 2011 (38% vs 22%; 22% 
vs 13%). So, in terms of opportunities, and fairness, the situation did 
not change between 1981 and 2011.
What has changed is the underlying social class structure of 
England and Wales. Over the past 40 years the proportion of the 
population from upper middle class, professional and managerial, 
origins has increased substantially. The proportion in traditionally 
working class jobs has reduced dramatically. This is due to reduced 
numbers in manufacturing and and other manual labour. In 1981, 
people aged between 19 and 28 were about five times as likely to 
have working class parents as upper-middle class parents; in 2011, 
this had dropped to one and a half times as likely. 
The story of social mobility into core cultural occupations is 
therefore complicated. The chances of young people getting into 
cultural work, according to their social origin, has not changed 
substantially, over time. At the same time, the class origins of those 
entering these jobs has changed dramatically, as the dispropor-
tionately high chances of those from upper middle class origins 
‘getting in’ combines with the larger number of upper middle class 
origin people in British society. 
The fact that, in terms of opportunities and fairness, the situation 
has not changed does not give cause for complacency. People from 
working class origins have faced, and still face, substantial barriers 
in gaining entry to creative jobs. It seems there was no ‘golden age’ 
for social mobility. 
Moreover, this change in the social origins of those making and 
commissioning cultural work has implications for the chances of 
working class experiences being represented in an informed way. 
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Conclusion 
The reality of who is in the workforce does not match the merito-
cratic hopes of a high proportion of our Panic! respondents. 
It also doesn’t match the ideals of policy makers and arts organ-
isations, for a more open and diverse cultural sector. 
Who works in the sector is a crucial form of inequality. However, 
the reasons for, and consequences of, this inequality are complex. 
They include unpaid work, but also more subtle barriers to entry, 
such as the homogeneous values, attitudes and tastes of people 
working in cultural occupations. These issues are explored in the 
following parts. 
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Part 3: Who gets paid to work in the arts? The problem of 
unpaid labour in cultural industries 15
This part discusses one reason behind inequality in cultural jobs, by 
focusing on unpaid work. 
Getting paid fairly is a central concern for cultural and creative 
workers. This is often a result of freelance work, temporary contracts, 
traineeships, or project-based work. Media debates have high-
lighted the problem of some people not being paid at all for their 
creative work.
There are two elements to this discourse. First, unpaid routes into an 
occupation. For example, until recently unpaid internships were com-
mon in publishing and the museums and galleries sectors. Second, 
working for free once individuals are working regularly or are secure 
within an occupation. Against this backdrop, Part 3 reports findings 
from the Panic! Survey of 2,487 creative workers and from the 237 
follow-up interviews. 
Our data suggests unpaid work is endemic across cultural occu-
pations. This is a fact well known to practitioners, policy makers and 
the public. We develop this well-known fact in several ways. 
We show that age and career stage, along with class origin, are 
the most important drivers for different experiences of unpaid 
work. 
For more experienced workers, unpaid work can be a choice to 
assist friends and colleagues. It is rarely a form of exploitation. For 
our respondents who are newer to cultural and creative work, 
unpaid work is inescapable, particularly in the form of the unpaid 
internship for those working in advertising and marketing, and in 
design. 
For those from working class backgrounds who were inter-
viewed, unpaid work was seen as inescapable and a form of exploita- 
tion. Those from upper-middle class origins expressed the same 
weight of expectation to work for free but were more likely to de-
scribe the potential career benefits of unpaid work.
Unpaid work is endemic to the lives of Panic! Survey 
respondents
As part of the Panic! Survey, we asked cultural workers about their 
experiences of working for free, across a variety of circumstances, 
Part 3: Who gets paid to work in the arts? The problem of unpaid labour  
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15. Part 3 is based on a project working paper: O’Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2017) ‘“There’s 
no way that you get paid to do the arts.” Unpaid labour across the cultural and creative 
life course’. Available from https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/28hjx
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such as unpaid internships; profit shares (a practice particularly 
associated with theatre); unpaid labour for oneself, for example time 
spent on one’s portfolio or project development; and working for free 
while others are being paid. In addition, many respondents drew 
attention to underpayment for work because of additional hours, or 
non-payment for overtime or additional hours on projects. 
Around 87% of the Panic! respondents, irrespective of creative 
occupation or demographics, reported having worked for free in 
some way. 
An important point to note is how having worked for free is re-
ported by all age groups, suggesting that it is not a new phenomenon. 
We can unpack this by looking at how types of free or unpaid 
work differ. Looking at unpaid internships, we see a much clearer 
difference by age, with 48% of people under 30 reporting they had 
done an unpaid internship, as opposed to 34% of our respondents 
between 30 and 39, 14% of our respondents between 40 and 49, 
and 6% of our respondents over 50. 
We also see that people working in some sectors are much more 
likely to have done unpaid internships, particularly in Advertising 
and marketing (46%), in Design: product, graphic and fashion (41%), 
in Film, TV, video, radio and photography (36%), and in Museums, 
galleries, and libraries (37%).
Age and class matter
Our survey results suggest that working for free is endemic to cultur-
al and creative occupations. 
However, the results also indicate that the unpaid internship is a 
more recent phenomenon. In order to understand these patterns, we 
have looked at data from our 237 interviewees, to show how working 
for free is patterned by age, or career stage, and by social class origin. 
For those later in life or later in their careers, and for those from 
more affluent, middle class, social origins, working for free was often 
a choice; it was beneficial to them; or it was a form of gift or assis-
tance to others. 
For younger, or early career individuals, and those from less 
affluent, working class, social origins, working for free was primarily 
a form of exploitation. 
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Working for free – a dominant story from our younger 
interviewees
Cat, a white, female artist whose parents were senior managers, cap- 
tures this experience of the younger creative workers we interviewed
‘I’ve never been paid to make or do anything… I would see anything 
that I’ve done within a gallery context, that’s all been unpaid. Yes, I 
have a studio and I do exhibitions relatively frequently and I have 
done a residency and have worked for a couple of galleries but it’s 
always been unpaid.’
Sarah, from a working class background with parents in London, 
now working in the music industry, told a similar story of her creative 
career. Internships were expected:
‘Job agencies told me that there was no way in hell that I was getting 
a job in publishing without an unpaid internship.’
But most of these were unpaid:
‘I did an internship… that would have been completely unpaid, I did 
another internship that was completely unpaid straight after that. 
Two internships completely unpaid... Over a period of about six 
months it was three internships, actually four because I started two 
simultaneously, but the second one, the second one of that simul-
taneous time was paying me… and that felt very unusual, like I was 
getting £50 a day.’
Class origin determined if this was a choice,  
or exploitation
It’s stating the obvious to point out that those with more financial 
resources to fund living costs are more able to afford unpaid work. 
Two designers, one from middle class origins and the other from a 
working class background, illustrate this point. 
Polly, a middle class origin respondent sees unpaid work as more of 
a ‘choice’:
‘I think it’s always been a choice to work. I’ve done some placements 
which were unpaid and I’ve done some projects which were unpaid 
or very, very low paid but I never had to do them because I didn’t 
have other work… I haven’t personally felt like, “If I didn’t do unpaid 
work, I’d never be able to get a job”.’
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Carla, from a working class background, provides the contrast. Her 
experience was common to our interviews from working class 
backgrounds. She highlights the necessity of unpaid work, but 
emphasises the difficulty of working for free without financial 
support. 
‘There were girls in my year, I think, in the summer were… in London, 
in Shoreditch, being able to work for free, whereas I could only do it 
for three months and that was a struggle. So, it is something that you 
really should be doing as a fashion designer because it really does 
help you, but then if you don’t have the money to do it, you don’t you 
don’t really get a chance to grow, so it’s not really fair.’
Older workers have very different experiences
These experiences directly contrast with older people’s experience 
of working unpaid or for free. For older and more established 
creative workers, the experience of unpaid work was one of 
underpay or of choice and autonomy. 
Des, a senior curator in his 50s, based in London, offered a 
perspective about autonomy and ability to choose:
‘Well I have chosen to do bits and bobs for free, when I have been a 
consultant. I think partly that is a generational thing.’
Sandra, a 41-year-old freelancer working across a variety of arts 
organisations, illustrates the experience of being underpaid and the 
refusal to work for no pay. 
‘Not for free. No. Not necessarily. I have done projects where the fee 
did not in any way relate to the amount of work that needed doing. I 
have never done something completely for free.’
This point is crucial for understanding the problem of unpaid work 
in cultural and creative occupations. Older workers were committed 
to choice and autonomy in association with working for free and 
asserting the value of their work. 
It is clear that although working for free is endemic to cultural 
jobs, the experience of it, and workers’ feelings towards it show 
important differences by age as well as social class.
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Conclusion
One of our older interviewees suggested that ‘There’s no way that 
you get paid to do the arts.’ This is a worrying perception.
Although there is a shared experience of not being paid, it is important 
to understand how this experience is socially divided. The divisions 
in the Panic! dataset were around age and social class origin. 
Understanding these divisions goes someway to explaining why 
some social groups can use working for free to their advantage in 
the labour market. Others, specifically the working class origin 
people whom Part 2 demonstrated are underrepresented in the 
cultural workforce, do not seem to be benefitting from working for 
free as a way of accessing their desired occupation. 
Unpaid work is a significant barrier to some for getting in and 
getting on in the cultural sector. However, this is something that is 
common to many modern professions, including the finance and 
charity sectors. 16 
There are more subtle barriers in cultural occupations, and more 
differences between cultural workers and other occupations. We 
explore these, in the form of values and tastes, in Part 4.
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16. Roberts, C. (2017) The Inbetweeners: The New Role of Graduate  
Internships in the Graduate Labour Market IPPR. Available from  
https://www.ippr.org/files/publications/pdf/ 
inbetweeners-the-new-role-of-internships_Apr2017.pdf
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Part 4: Attitudes, values and tastes: An unrepresentative 
‘creative class’?
The prevalence of unpaid work is one explanation for inequalities in 
the cultural sector. In this part, we outline more subtle barriers, 
based on attitudes and tastes.
Cultural workers have attitudes, values and tastes, that are very 
different from those of the rest of the population. We begin by 
exploring the values and attitudes of cultural and creative workers, 
using data from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey. 
The story from the BSA survey data is of a set of cultural and 
creative industries with attitudes that are the most liberal, most 
pro-welfare and most left wing of any industry. 
We then turn to analysis of the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport’s (DCMS) Taking Part Survey. This demonstrates creative 
industries workers are much more likely to attend arts and cultural 
activities, and thus have very different tastes from workers in other 
occupations. 
In contrast, most other occupations are characterised by not 
engaging very heavily in formal cultural activities. 
How the values and attitudes of cultural and creative 
workers differ from the rest of the population. 17
Most occupations are characterised by shared cultures, including 
and excluding people, often as a result of sharing or not sharing the 
same set of values. 
In some professions this is a formal culture associated with an 
educational pathway, for example in medicine or law. In other areas 
of the economy it is much more informal. 
To understand the shared culture of creative occupations, we 
offer several different lines of analysis. 
We have already demonstrated the demographics of the creative 
sector in Part 2. Here we think about the values and attitudes of that 
workforce. 
Our analysis uses six years (2010 to 2015) of British Social Attitudes 
Survey data. The BSA Survey has run for 35 years, exploring a range 
of different attitudes in the UK. 
We focus on two sets of questions designed to understand whether 
people are more liberal or authoritarian, and how people position 
Part 4: Attitudes, values and tastes: an unrepresentative ‘creative class’?
17. This summarises the project working paper: McAndrew, S., O’Brien, D. and Taylor, M. 
(2017) ‘Cultural Values, Imagined Community and Cultural Backlash: Value Divergence 
and Social Closure among British Creative Workers’. Available from  
https://osf.io/wkxs5/
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themselves with respect to left and right in politics. These results are 
also consistent with responses to questions about social welfare, 
although we’ve not highlighted that analysis here.
Figure 5 shows responses to liberal/authoritarian questions and 
Figure 6 shows responses to left/right politics questions. The results 
of our analysis are shown by occupational group, comparing cultural 
and creative workers’ values and attitudes to those of people work-
ing in sectors as varied as construction, healthcare, finance, and mining. 
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Figure 5 British Social Attitudes responses to liberal/authoritarian questions by  
occupational group.
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Attitudes, values and tastes: an unrepresentative ‘creative class’?Part 4
Figure 6 British Social Attitudes responses to left/right questions by occupational group.
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Both graphs show a distinct pattern, with cultural and creative 
workers positioned as the most liberal and most left wing compared 
to all other industrial sectors.
It might be the case that it is not the sector that is influencing these 
views, rather the age or level of education of individual workers. Our 
analysis takes these variables into account, as we explain in the 
statistical models in our full paper. 18 Even when accounting for 
things like education level, which is an important influence on values 
and attitudes, cultural and creative industries’ values and attitudes 
are still different from those of the rest of the population. 
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(2017) ‘Cultural Values, Imagined Community and Cultural Backlash: Value Divergence 
and Social Closure among British Creative Workers’. Available from  
https://osf.io/wkxs5/
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How cultural sector workers’ tastes differs from the rest 
of the population 
This analysis indicates cultural workers have sets of ethical and 
political values that are different from people in many other occupa-
tions in society.
We now turn to cultural workers’ tastes, using an analysis of eight 
waves of the government’s Taking Part Survey of cultural engage-
ment in England. Those working in cultural and creative occupations 
are major outliers in terms of cultural consumption.
Who attends culture in England?
The government’s analysis suggests the majority of the population 
(81%) are engaging in arts activity at least once a year 19, but our 
analysis, which focuses on attending arts events and venues, shows 
that a third of the population have not attended in the last 12 months, 
and 22% of the population do not attend any cultural activities 
included in this survey. Attending the arts very regularly is only the 
norm for a minority of English society. 
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19. DCMS (2017) Taking Part Survey: April to September 2017 (Provisional). Available at 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664921/
Mid-year_17-18_TP_release.pdf This document also contains (in Annex B) the definition 
we use for attending cultural events and venues.
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We can illustrate this point by looking at attendance at least once a 
year for a variety of art forms: 20
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Figure 7 Percentage of people attending art forms at least once a year 
20. This analysis develops work from: Taylor, M. (2016) ‘Nonparticipation or different 
styles of participation? Alternative interpretations from Taking Part’, Cultural Trends 
25(3): 169–181. Available from  
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102893/27/MT%20Paper%20-%20%20270516.pdf
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Figures 8 and 9 show the results of analysing the various cultural 
activities in the Taking Part Survey, along with responses to the 
question ‘Have you attended one of or more of the following in the 
past year?’ 
In figure 8 the x axis, running from left to right, distinguishes 
activity from inactivity. 
The further away an activity is from the point on the graph 
where the horizontal and vertical lines cross, the more unusual it is 
for people to go to it. For example, contemporary dance and opera 
are very far from where the two lines cross, indicating that attend-
ing such events is unusual. 
Almost all the categories for not attending particular events are 
closer to the point where these lines cross than their corresponding 
categories for attending them. So we can say that not attending the 
activities on the far left hand side of the graph is the norm for the 
majority of the population. 
The cultural forms towards the left hand side are those that have 
fewest respondents saying they have attended. 
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Contemporary dance, book events, classical, opera, and ballet are, 
based on our analysis of the Taking Part Survey, minority pastimes 
when considered against the norm of non-attendance clustered on 
the right-hand side of the graph. 
The y axis, running from the top to the bottom of Figure 8 shows 
the type of culture attended. 
Here the split is between ‘classical’ forms of culture, clustered 
towards the top of the graph, and contemporary forms, which are 
nearer to the bottom. 
Existing academic research has demonstrated that cultural con-
sumption is closely related to particular forms of inequality, such 
as education, social status and social class. The sorts of inequalities 
we see in the labour force are important expressions of similar 
types of social inequalities. Crucially, who makes and who con-
sumes culture are related by shared social inequalities. 
What are the tastes of cultural workers in England?
In this section we look specifically at cultural workers, showing how 
different the picture is for them.
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Figure 9 visualises how arts attendance is patterned by occupation. 
As we’ve already shown, non-attendance, or ‘not’ doing many art forms 
regularly is the norm for much of the British population. When this 
data is considered by groups of occupations we see an obvious set of 
outliers: those people working in the jobs that are producing culture.
Our visualisation shows that arts workers and media workers 
have attended 4 times as many art forms in the last year as compared 
to people in working class occupations.
Even when compared to people in professional occupations, 
both arts and media workers have higher attendance levels. Our two 
groups of ‘cultural’ workers attend around one third more art forms 
than middle class professionals. 
The taste division within cultural and creative occupations is not 
over engagement, as almost all are committed frequent attenders. 
Rather, it is over the cultural form. 
We’ve visualised this using two different colours, pink showing 
contemporary cultural tastes, pattern showing more classical forms.
For media workers, for example those in film and TV, their tastes 
are more contemporary, such as street art and festivals. At the same 
time, they have similar levels of committed engagement as their 
colleagues in artistic and literary occupations. 
These patterns display a key difference. The difference that the 
Taking Part data shows, in relation to cultural engagement, is be-
tween those producing culture and the rest of the population. 
Figure 9 Cultural attendance by occupation
Working class Intermediate Higher managerial/ 
professional
Art/lit Media
Classical  
attendance 
 
Contemporary  
attendance
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This is not just a difference as a result of age or education, nor a 
difference between the professional middle class and working class 
occupations. 
Cultural and creative workers’ tastes differ even from those in 
other occupations classified as NS-SEC I, the upper middle class of 
professional and managerial occupations such as doctors, engi-
neers and lawyers. 
Conclusion
Why do the attitudes, values and tastes of cultural workers matter?
Our analysis of BSA Survey data shows the creative industries as 
the most liberal and left wing of any sector. 
Alongside this analysis, the Taking Part data demonstrates that, by 
cultural attendance, cultural and creative workers have very different 
tastes from the rest of the population. 
This difference, taken with our analysis of values and attitudes, adds 
to the picture of a ‘creative class’ quite distinct from the rest of society. 
As American research shows 21, cultural tastes play an important 
role in getting into upper-middle class occupations. Hiring can be 
a form of ‘cultural matching’, excluding those who do not have the 
shared tastes of specific social groups. This is especially true in cul-
tural and creative occupations and is another important and subtle 
barrier for those seeking to work in the sector. 
Second, there is a broader question of representation. Academic 
work, along with public debates, demonstrates the mismatch be-
tween who is working to make culture and the representations 
expected by those from outside a predominantly white, male, or 
middle class ‘norm’ (or demographic) in industries such as theatre, 
film and television. 
When seen in the context of the labour force inequalities, and the 
Panic! respondents’ closed social networks, this raises questions 
about the relationship between creative workers and the rest of the 
population.
21. Koppman, S. (2016) ‘Different like me: Why cultural omnivores get creative jobs’ 
Administrative Science Quarterly 61(2) 291–331
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Conclusion
Overall, our findings present a challenge to the sector, particularly 
given the faith in meritocracy demonstrated by our analysis of the 
Panic! Survey. 
We conclude with important questions we believe are raised by 
this research work: 
• To what extent are cultural and creative occupations accessible 
and ‘meritocratic’ if the demographics of its workers, their social 
origins, and their networks are relatively homogeneous?
• To what extent is the cultural and creative sector delivering on 
representing individuals, communities, and the nation if research 
suggests its tastes, values and attitudes are also relatively 
coherent? 
• How will a sector with such different cultural engagement speak 
for the rest of a society for whom non-engagement is the norm?
• And, looking at our cultural and creative industries as a whole, who 
is missing from the picture?
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Research and resources
If you’d like to know more about the research underpinning this re-
port, read more detailed analysis, or find references to m academic 
research on these issues, the published and working papers are 
available as follows:
Meritocracy 
Taylor, M. and O’Brien, D. (2017) ‘“Culture is a Meritocracy”:  
Why Creative Workers’ Attitudes may Reinforce Social Inequality’, 
Sociological Research Online 22(4). Available from 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1360780417726732 
The cultural and creative labour force
Brook, O., O’Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2018) ‘There was no golden 
age: social mobility into cultural and creative occupations’. 
Available from https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/7njy3 
Oakley, K., Laurison, D., O’Brien, D. and Friedman, S. (2017) ‘Cultural 
Capital: Arts Graduates, Spatial Inequality, and London’s Impact on 
Cultural Labor Markets’, American Behavioral Scientist 61(12), 1510–1531. 
Available from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002764217734274
O’Brien, D., Laurison, D., Friedman, S. and Miles, A. (2016) ‘Are the 
creative industries meritocratic? An analysis of the 2014 British 
Labour Force survey’, Cultural Trends 25, 116–131. Available from 
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09548963.2016.1170943?journalCode=ccut20
Working for free
O’Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2017) ‘“There’s no way that you get paid 
to do the arts.” Unpaid labour across the cultural and creative life 
course’. Available from https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/28hjx
Values and tastes
Campbell, P., O’Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2018, forthcoming) ‘Cultural 
Engagement and the Economic Performance of the Cultural and 
Creative Industries: An occupational critique’ Sociology
McAndrew, S., O’Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2017) ‘Cultural Values, 
Imagined Community and Cultural Backlash: Value Divergence  
and Social Closure among British Creative Workers.’ 
Available from https://osf.io/wkxs5/
Taylor, M. (2016) ‘Nonparticipation or different styles of participa-
tion? Alternative interpretations from Taking Part’, Cultural Trends 
25(3), 169–181. Available from http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102893/27/
MT%20Paper%20-%20%20270516.pdf
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Data and methods 
This project builds on and develops a full, now global, field 
concerned with cultural work and cultural consumption. 
As this is not an academic paper, we have avoided, where 
possible, extensive references. However, an indication of 
the massive volume of academic research that has shaped 
and informed this work can be seen in the full papers under- 
pinning this report, along with the extensive lists of refer-
ences in each. 
The report summarises a specific set of research papers, 
using specific datasets. It is not a comprehensive picture 
of every axis of social inequality. For example, one part of 
the project primarily focused on social class and its 
relationship to social mobility, with ethnicity and gender 
as important intersecting elements of the analysis. How-
ever, this focus meant it was not possible, for this report, 
to focus on other important aspects of inequality. The 
team are not experts in the field of disability or sexuality 
and LGBTQI studies, meaning those two axes of inequality 
are not the focus of the project. Disability in the cultural 
and creative workforce is a topic of particular importance 
for future work, particularly in light of recent Arts Council 
England research.23 
Parts 1 and 3: Panic! dataset 
In 2015, Create London, the originators of the Panic! pro-
ject, worked with The Guardian and an academic team to 
run a survey of people working in Britain’s cultural sector. 
Survey data was collected over the period 21 September to 
20 October. 
The survey consisted of questions on respondents’ cre-
ative work, their sources of income and outgoings, their 
attitudes towards the sector(s), their social network, and 
relevant demographics. 
The survey questionnaire was designed to use similar or 
identical question wording to that used in nationally repre- 
sentative surveys. For example, questions about work, 
social origin, and demographic characteristics were de-
signed to be comparable with questions from the quarterly 
Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) Labour Force Survey. 
The final question in the web survey asked respondents 
to leave their email address if they were interested in 
being contacted for any further research; in response, 55% 
of respondents left their email address. These respondents 
were emailed in January of 2016 to confirm their interest.
Interviews were conducted by a mixture of Skype, tele-
phone and face to face; they were audio recorded, and 
lasted around an hour. During the interviews, participants 
were asked about their background and trajectory into 
their creative work, their influences, their work history and 
current work, reflections on success, social class and other 
barriers, and their own cultural tastes and interests. The 
audio recordings of the interviews were then transcribed 
and coded
Interviewees gave their informed consent to the use of 
interview data on the basis of it being non-attributable 
and anonymised. In this report we have used pseudonyms 
and removed identifying characteristics from the data. 
Working for free formed a dedicated sub-section of the 
interview schedule, interviewers asking variations on the 
question ‘Do you ever have to work for free?’ In many cases 
this was unnecessary, as a large fraction of interviewees 
independently discussed working without pay during the 
course of the interview. 
The survey attracted 2,487 responses and the research 
team conducted follow-up interviews with 237 participants. 
Part 2: Office for National Statistics’ Labour Force 
Survey and Longitudinal Study
The first part of the analysis in Part 2 draws on two academic 
papers studying the demographics in the creative 
industries. The data here is from the ONS’ Labour Force 
Survey. This is the largest nationally representative 
sample of employment in the United Kingdom, with 
around 100,000 respondents surveyed annually. It is the 
basis for employment and unemployment figures, and 
covers topics such as hours worked, earnings, and a range 
of demographic characteristics. 
The Labour Force Survey now includes a question on 
social origin, asking about parental occupation during a 
respondent’s teenage years. Parental occupation is one of 
the ways social scientists talk about social class. It is also 
one of the methods social scientists use to understand 
social mobility. 
The second part of the analysis looks specifically at 
social mobility. This section uses the ONS Longitudinal 
Study (ONS-LS). This is a 1% sample of census returns for 
England and Wales, based on four birthdays. People with 
these birthdays are linked between censuses since 1971, so 
that we can follow people through their life course without 
relying on fallible memories.
It’s not the only data source on social mobility – the UK 
has an excellent series of cohort studies – but the ONS-LS 
has the advantages of a large sample size, extraordinary 
response rates (as the census is compulsory) and very 
high linkage rates between censuses. As we can also see 
details of their households, we can compare the jobs that 
subjects’ parents had when they were teenagers to the 
work that they themselves do at later points in time.
For this study we defined cohorts that were born 
during 10-year periods, from 1953–62, 63–72, 73–82 and 
83-92, so that they are aged 9 to 18 at their first census 
(1971 for cohort 1) and aged 19–28 at their second census 
(1981 for cohort 1). We’ve only included in our analysis 
those who are living with at least one parent in work, so 
that we can assess their social class origin. 23. Arts Council England (2017) Making a Shift Report. 
Available at www.artscouncil.org.uk/sites/default/files/
download-file/ACE206%20MAKING%20A%20
SHIFT%20Report%20FINAL.pdf
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Part 4: The British Social Attitudes Survey and  
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s  
Taking Part Survey
The first part of the analysis uses data from the British 
Social Attitudes (BSA) survey. This is a long-running social 
survey that interviews a random, nationally representative, 
sample of around 3,000 people about a range of social 
issues. The survey questions are designed to be consistent 
over time, although new topics are added to reflect 
changes in society. For example, attitudes towards the 
rights of gay people have been a longstanding set of 
questions for the survey. 
In our analysis we look at two clusters of questions, 
about left and right positions in politics, and liberal and 
authoritarian social attitudes. These include responses to 
statements including ‘Government should redistribute 
income from the better off to those who are less well off’ 
and ‘Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of 
the nation’s wealth’ (for left and right values) and state-
ments including ‘Young people today don’t have enough 
respect for traditional British values’ and ‘Censorship of 
films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral stan-
dards.’ (for liberal and authoritarian values). 
Our research used six waves, from 2010 to 2015, to 
ensure a large enough sample of people for analysis. 
The findings present an analysis of responses by oc-
cupation, looking at the differences between arts workers, 
and other occupational groups, such as those in construc-
tion, finance or agriculture. 
 The next part of the analysis uses the Taking Part survey. 
This survey has run annually since 2005/2006, and cur-
rently has around 10,000 respondents in each annual 
wave. As with BSA, the questions are designed to be con-
sistent over time, with some questions being introduced 
or dropped each year. It focuses on culture and sport, 
particularly how people spend their time: what events 
they attend, what they participate in, their volunteering, 
and so on. 
In our analysis, we focus on questions about the cultural 
events they have attended, including going to a film at the 
cinema; a play or drama; a jazz performance; and to a 
carnival. We investigate the events people have attended 
in the context of their occupations. Occupations are 
treated both in the broad sense, of which social class their 
jobs are in (according to the National Statistics Socio-
economic Classification), and whether they work in one of 
a list of groups of jobs in the cultural and creative indus-
tries, such as media professionals or archivists and librarians.
This research uses data from 2005/06 to 2012/13, as 
those are the waves where specific data on people’s occu-
pations were available. 
We’ve also included a longer discussion of key terms 
and ideas, such as social class and social mobility, in the 
next section of this report. 
Key terms
In this report we’ve presented a lot of analysis from a range 
of different datasets. We’ve also used a series of technical 
terms, particularly in relation to class and the creative in-
dustries. In order to clarify some of the meanings and 
ideas, this section presents more detail of key ideas. 
BAME
When thinking about race and ethnicity, Arts Council 
England (ACE) use the grouping ‘Black and Minority 
Ethnic’. We’ve shortened this to ‘BAME’.24 The term is con-
tested, and there are several problems associated with 
bringing diverse ethnic groups together under one cat-
egory. There are also risks that the category leads us to 
ignore the fact that White British is also an ethnic group. 
However, we have followed ACE’s terminology, partic-
ularly in order to highlight underrepresentations in the 
labour force. In the Panic! work, whether someone is clas-
sified as BAME is based on their response to the question 
‘What is your ethnic group?’
Cultural and creative industries 
The cultural and creative industries (CCIs) have a complex 
and contested history. The formal definition of this group 
of industries and occupations within British government 
policy came in the late 1990s with a set of mapping docu-
ments. Since then the definition has been refined, partic-
ularly in light of debates over the role of IT and computer 
services. 
The current definition of a what the government calls 
‘creative industries’ is based on the levels of creative 
activity and creative occupations within that industry. 25 
This definition currently includes nine areas within the 
cultural and creative industries: Advertising and market-
ing; Architecture; Crafts; Design; Film, TV, video, radio and 
photography; IT, software and computer services; Pub-
lishing; Museums, galleries and libraries; Music, performing 
and visual art. 
Within these nine clusters, the government uses two 
sets of classifications to create estimates of the economic 
activity within creative industries: Standard Industrial 
Classifications (SIC) and Standard Occupational Classifi-
cations (SOC). SIC codes refer to types of industry, to 
understand business activity. SOC codes are focused on 
sets of occupations, to understand jobs. In the current 
government definition, the nine clusters of creative indus-
tries correspond to 30 individual occupations. For example, 
24. Arts Council England (2016) Equality, Diversity and 
the Creative Case. Available at www.artscouncil.org.uk/
sites/default/files/download-file/Equality_diversity_
creativecase_2015_16_web_0.pdf  
25. DCMS (2017) Creative Industries Economic Estimates 
Methodology. Available at www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/499683/CIEE_Methodology.pdf
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Publishing consists of (SOC 2471) Journalists, newspaper 
and periodical editors and (SOC 3412) Authors, writers 
and translators. 
There are also 31 individual industrial sectors within the 
nine clusters of creative industries. To continue the exam-
ple of Publishing, it consists of six types of industrial activity 
(SIC 58.11) Book publishing: (SIC 58.12) Publishing of 
directories and mailing lists; (SIC 58.13) Publishing of 
newspapers; (SIC 58.14) Publishing of journals and 
periodicals; (SIC 58.19) Other publishing activities; and 
(SIC 74.30) Translation and interpretation activities.
The nine clusters of creative industries contain many of 
areas of the economy that are different and distinctive 
from each other, but are brought together under the 
government’s estimate of the level of creative activity 
within them. Architects (SOC 2431), for example, are 
characterised by formal barriers to entry and long periods 
of study. This is very different to Artists (SOC 3411), who 
may be self-taught and do not require formal qualifica-
tions to practise. Likewise, occupations in Crafts, for exam-
ple Smiths and forge workers (SOC 5211), have a distinc-
tive skillset and job role compared with Information tech- 
nology and telecommunications directors (SOC 1136).
The SOC codes are a means of clustering occupations 
together, based on shared characteristics such as manual 
and non-manual labour, autonomy and supervision of other 
workers.
‘Core’ creative jobs
In terms of our analysis we have focused on creative oc-
cupations rather than industries–so, for example, graphic 
designers who work for accountancy firms are included, 
but accountants who work for a theatre are not. This is the 
conventional way to analyse social mobility (see below).
In order to look at trends over time, we have had to 
translate these codes back to previous categorisations. 
For this reason, we have not included Crafts in our analysis 
of change over time: many current Crafts occupations are 
skilled manufacturing (for example, Forge worker) rather 
than the kind of home-based artisanal work that the name 
conjures, and it becomes increasingly difficult to decide 
whether jobs related to metalworking, for example, should 
be included as a craft.
We have also needed to group occupations together in 
order to have large enough numbers of people for mean-
ingful analysis. We created a core cultural occupations 
category, which includes artists, actors, entertainers, 
musicians and people working in publishing, media, 
libraries, museums and galleries. These are the jobs that 
we consider to be most involved in creating, curating and 
presenting the culture that we consume. They also, collec-
tively, constitute a robust number of people to analyse. 
While there will be differences between occupations with-
in this group, we have not included any occupation to which 
the overall findings do not apply (so there is no evidence 
of a ‘golden age’ in any of these occupations, for example).
 
Class
Class is a deeply contested term in Britain. On the one hand 
it describes a technical set of classifications used by social 
researchers; on the other it is about individuals’ and com-
munities’ sense of identity. It can be used as a shorthand 
for social divisions and social inequalities, and it can be 
about occupations and their relations to working con-
ditions and the labour market. As a result, class is a con-
fusing term. 
In this project, we use the National Statistics Socio-
economic Classification (NS-SEC).26 NS-SEC clusters 
occupations together into eight groups, from I (higher 
managerial and professional, which includes doctors, 
CEOs and lawyers) to VII (routine occupations such as bar 
staff, care workers, and cleaners), while VIII is those who 
have never worked or who are long-term unemployed. 
The NS-SEC allows us to do two things. It gives a clear 
definition of class, which is based on employment and 
occupation. It also allows us to comment on class-based 
forms of inequality. 
Our work has focused on cultural and creative occupa-
tions. Aside from Crafts, cultural and creative occupations 
are almost all placed in the NS-SEC I and II categories. This 
means we can think of them as ‘middle class’ jobs, even 
though they may be low-paid and precarious for many 
people trying to work in them. 
This technical, employment and occupation-based 
understanding of class is of course not the only way to 
understand class relations. To fully understand cultural 
and creative occupations and any related inequalities, it is 
also important to ask how see employment and occupa-
tional relations intersect with characteristics such as gender, 
ethnicity or disability. It is also important to think about the 
meaning of a category such as class, beyond just the em-
ployment and occupation categorisation. This work is the 
subject of extensive academic research, along with public 
and media debate, and individuals’ own sense of identity. 
Discussing how the technical categories interact and 
shape individual identity might be a fruitful area for artistic 
and cultural work, given how central the contested category 
of class remains to British society. 
2. A full and extensive discussion of the NS-SEC is available from the ONS  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/classificationsandstandards/otherclassifications/
nationalstatisticssocioeconomicclassificationnssecrebasedonsoc2010 
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Social mobility
The confusion surrounding class, and the difference 
between how it the term is used in popular media and the 
academy, is similar to the confusion surrounding social 
mobility. In media and popular discussion social mobility 
is often a shorthand for the sorts of social inequalities that 
class is also describing (along with various other axes of 
inequality such as gender and ethnicity).
However, in academic research social mobility has a 
precise definition. It describes the rates of individuals 
moving from one social class to another, from their origin 
class to their destination class. It is a description of proba-
bility, rather than a comment on the fairness, or morality, 
of individuals moving classes. For some people there is no 
movement, the class they are born into is the class they 
end up in. For others there is long- or short-range mobility 
between classes. 
The idea of long- or short-range mobility is dependent 
on seeing class as a set of occupational groups. Our work 
adopts this approach to class, using the NS-SEC de-
scribed above. The overall rates of social mobility are the 
total numbers who end up working in a different NS-SEC 
category from the work their parents did when they were 
around 14. 
In the most recent surveys of the labour force, the ONS 
has asked people about their class origin. They have done 
this by asking what the main income earner in their 
household did for work when they were about 14. Know-
ing if someone had a parent who was a doctor (NS-SEC I) 
or a cleaner (NS-SEC VII) allows us to understand their 
class origin. We can say, for the purpose of understanding 
the broad patterns in the labour force, how many working- 
or middle class origin people there are. Once we know 
this, we can compare those origins to destinations, for 
example asking how many children of cleaners (NS-SEC 
VII) end up working as doctors (NS-SEC I). This allows us to 
understand social mobility in society, how many of origins 
are different from destinations. 
As we have said, cultural and creative industries are 
defined as middle class jobs for the purposes of NS-SEC. 
However, many people within those jobs draw on class 
identities that are about their social starting point. Here 
we return to the question of origins and destinations. 
Because the ONS now collects information on parental 
occupation, we are able to estimate the numbers of cre-
ative workers who are from middle class origins (for ex-
ample the children of doctors, defined as NS-SEC I) or 
working class origins (for example, the children of cleaners, 
defined as NS-SEC VII). We can ask questions about the 
rate of social mobility, of how open cultural and creative 
occupations are to people from specific social origins, 
and whether specific social origins are under- or over-
represented in cultural and creative jobs. 
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